Surveys of Recent Developments in Third Circuit Law
In this survey section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents surveys of recent Third Circuit cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, the Law Review hopes to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of interesting
changes in significant areas of practice.
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AID-Cureton v. National
CollegiateAthletic Ass'n, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999).

VARSHY ATHLETICS AND RECEIVE FINANCIAL

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a
voluntary organization that is composed of over 1000 colleges and
universities located throughout the United States, devoted to the
administration of intercollegiate athletic competitions. See Cureton v.
National CollegiateAthletic Ass'n, 198 F.3d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 1999). The
NCAA receives dues from its members and federal grants from the
Department of Health and Human Services for the National Youth
Sports Program (NYSP) Fund, a financially independent, nonprofit
affiliate of the NCAA.
The NCAA members are divided into three divisions, each of
which may enact bylaws governing their athletic competitions. In
1992, Division I adopted Proposition 16, which established minimum
Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT) and grade-point average (GPA)
requirements for every high school graduate who desires to compete
in varsity athletics as a freshman. The minimum score required for
students to be eligible for athletic competition and/or financial aid is
computed utilizing a sliding-scale formula by which the minimum
required SAT score varies based on the student's GPA, and vice-versa.
See id. at 110-11.
Four African-American high school students who were deemed
ineligible under Proposition 16 filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that
the minimum-SAT component of the bylaw violated the regulations
promulgated pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d to d-1 (1994), which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin in any program receiving
federal financial assistance. See id. The plaintiffs asserted that
Proposition 16 created an "unjustified disparate impact on AfricanAmerican student-athletes" because these students are denied the
benefits of athletic competition and financial aid at a
disproportionately higher rate than are whites. Id.
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In holding that Proposition 16 violates the regulations issued
under Title VI because of its discriminatory effect on AfricanAmericans, the district court offered two theories. See id. at 111-12.
First, the district court determined that the NCAA is an indirect
recipient of federal funds because the NYSP Fund is only a conduit
through which the NCAA makes decisions about the Fund. See id. at
111. Second, the court found the member schools to have vested the
NCAA with controlling authority over their federally funded athletic
programs. See id, at 112 After determining that the minimum SAT
component of Proposition 16 resulted in an unjustified disparate
impact on African-American student-athletes, the district court
concluded that the NCAA failed to meet its burden of demonstrating
an educational necessity sufficient to justify this adverse effect. See id.
Consequently, the district court permanently enjoined the NCAA
from utilizing SAT scores to determine freshman eligibility for
participation in athletic competition or receipt of athletic
scholarships. See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Greenberg, reversed the district court's order
enjoining the NCAA from using SAT scores to determine freshman
eligibility and receipt of scholarship funds under Proposition 16. See
id. at 118. The court held that the NCAA is not subject to liability
under Title VI or the regulations promulgated thereunder because
the NCAA does not receive any form of direct or indirect federal
financial assistance. See id. at 117-18.
The court initially observed that the United States Supreme
Court has limited Title VI to prohibit only intentional discrimination.
See id. at 113 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1985)).
The court noted that any NCAA liability must stem from regulations
issued under Title VI by the Department of Health and Human
Services and the Department of Education (Departments), which
specifically expanded Title VI to include disparate impact
discrimination. See id. Judge Greenberg, however, pointed out that a
finding that the NCAA is a recipient of federal funds is a necessary
antecedent to any consideration of whether the minimum SAT
component of Proposition 16 results in an improper discriminatory
effect on African-American student-athletes. See id.
The court proceeded to analyze this threshold issue under a
number of different theories, all of which the district court originally
considered. See id. at 114. Judge Greenberg concurred with the
district court's judgment and dismissed without discussion the
possibility that the NYSP Fund is the alter ego of the NCAA. See id.
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Next, the judge addressed the question of whether the NCAA
indirectly receives federal financial assistance by virtue of its
relationship with the NYSP Fund. See id. Without deciding that this
relationship is adequate to support a finding that the NCAA is an
indirect recipient of assistance provided to the NYSP Fund, the court
stressed that Title VI is a program-specific statute under existing
Supreme Court precedent. See id. (citing Grove City College v. BeI4, 465
U.S. 555, 570-71 (1984)). Thus, Judge Greenberg concluded that any
regulations promulgated under Title VI must also be programspecific and further determined that the express language of the
regulations themselves dictate this result. See id. at 115.
Judge Greenberg next observed that Congress, in response to
the Supreme Court's holding in Grove City, enacted the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1994), which
amended Title VI to apply to federal financial assistance recipients on
an institution-wide basis. See id. Nevertheless, the judge declared that
Title VI regulations remain program-specific because the
Departments have not modified their regulations since the
amendment took effect. See id. The court emphasized that neither
Congress nor the Departments have contemplated the impact of
allowing institution-wide liability upon a finding of disparate impact
discrimination.
See id. The judge further remarked that any
modification of the Title VI regulations must provide interested
parties with notice and an opportunity to comment in order to
comply with the Administrative Procedure Act. See id. at 115-16
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1996)). Consequently, Judge Greenberg
concluded that, because the NYSP Fund's programs and activities are
not implicated in this case, no liability may be imposed on the NCAA
that is grounded on federal grants to the NYSP Fund. See id. at 116.
Judge Greenberg then took issue with the dissent's assertion that
the NCAA may be liable under Title VI because the NYSP Fund is the
alter ego of the NCAA. See id. The judge pointed out that, because
the dissent agreed that the Title VI regulations are program-specific,
it is immaterial whether the NCAA is the alter ego of the NYSP Fund
because its programs and activities are not implicated in this case. See
id. Furthermore, the court determined that the Civil Rights
Restoration Act's imposition of institution-wide Title VI liability on
entities receiving federal financial assistance is inapplicable because
liability for discrimination under Tide VI itself may not be premised
on a disparate impact. See id. Accordingly, Judge Greenberg
reasserted that, under the facts of this case, no liability may be
imposed on the NCAA by virtue of its involvement with federal grants
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to the NYSP Fund, even if the NCAA directly received this money. See
id.
The judge next addressed the final theory of Title VI liability,
which examines whether the NCAA is an indirect recipient of federal
funds because it is vested with controlling authority over the federally
funded athletic programs of its member institutions. See id. At the
outset, Judge Greenberg noted that the Supreme Court has required
that an entity be the intended beneficiary of federal funds to be
considered an indirect recipient and, thus, has explicitly rejected any
suggestion that the payment of membership dues subjects the NCAA
to Title IX liability, including federal funds earmarked for NCAA use.
See id. (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 119 S. Ct. 924,
926 (1999)). Analogizing Title IX to Title VI, the court declared that
the controlling authority theory must be substantiated on some other
premise aside from the mere receipt of dues. See id. In this regard,
the court surveyed case law dealing with civil liability based on
controlling authority. See id.
Judge Greenberg examined a Sixth Circuit case in which a high
school athletic association was subjected to Title IX liability when it
was authorized by statute to administer interscholastic athletics in
addition to controlling and managing over $396 million in federal
funds on behalf of its Department of Education. See id. (citing Homer
v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 272 (6th Cir. 1994)).
The judge then analyzed a Seventh Circuit case in which the court
held that individual supervisors are not liable under Title IX because
they do not actually receive federal financial assistance, despite the
fact that they have control over federal funds. See id. at 117 (citing
Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014, 1019-21 (7th Cir.
1997)). Although not a Title VI or Title IX case, the court found the
Supreme Court's holding in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Tarkanianmost persuasive. See id. Tarkanian dealt with the issue of
whether the NCAA was a state actor for purposes of civil rights
liability for threatening to sanction the University of Nevada at Las
Vegas (UNLV) unless the university suspended its basketball coach.
See id. (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S.
179 (1988)). In Tarkanian,Judge Greenberg explained, because the
NCAA has not been vested with the power to sanction directly any
university employee and because UNLV had the option to face the
sanctions or voluntarily withdraw from the NCAA, the NCAA was not
considered a state actor on account of the control it exerts over its
members. See id. (citing Tarkanian,488 U.S. at 195-98).
Turning to the case at hand, Judge Greenberg highlighted the
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fact that the member colleges and universities are the ultimate
arbiters as to which freshmen are eligible to compete in varsity
athletics and which applicants are worthy of athletic financial aid: See
id. Thejudge differentiated the present case from Hornerand further
emphasized that, regardless of the unattractiveness of these
alternatives, the members always have the choice either to withdraw
from the NCAA or ignore the bylaws and risk sanctions. See id. As a
result, the court adopted the reasoning of Tarkanianand found that
the NCAA is not subject to Title VI liability because its members are
not vested with controlling authority over their athletic operations.
See id. at 117-18.
Finally, Judge Greenberg maintained that a finding of disparate
impact discrimination against the NCAA would be adverse to the
contractual nature of Title VI. See id. at 118. The judge also
evaluated the limited scope of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C.A. § 794 (1999), which limits liability to the actual recipients of
federal financial assistance who have the ability to decide whether to
accept or reject the burdens that accompany the aid. See id. (citing
United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597,
605 (1986)). Recognizing the similarity between Title VI and the
Rehabilitation Act, both of which were enacted under the Spending
Clause of the United States Constitution, the court pointed to the
lack of contractual privity between the NCAA and the Departments
regarding the federal grants received by the member institutions. See
id. The court then found that the NCAA could not refuse these
funds. See id. While not completely foreclosing the possibility of
imposing Title VI liability where no privity exists, Judge Greenberg
announced that courts should be wary of imposing liability on entities
that have no control over the decision of whether to accept federal
financial assistance. See id. The court then reversed the order of the
district court and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment
in favor of the NCAA. See id.
Judge McKee, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed
with the majority's conclusion that the Title VI regulations are
program-specific and, thus, proffered that the NCAA cannot be liable
on the theory that it indirectly receives federal financial assistance
from the NYSP Fund. See id. at 119-20 (McKee, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Judge McKee believed, however, that the
NCAA may be liable under Title VI because it has controlling
authority over its members or, in the alternative, on account of the
NYSP Fund acting as the alter ego of the NCAA. See id. at 119
(McKee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As a result,
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Judge McKee would have remanded the case for proper resolution of
the alter ego issue. See id.
Judge McKee first addressed the theory that the NCAA is the
controlling entity of its member institutions. See id. at 121 (McKee, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The judge argued that
the NCAA Constitution specifically vests the NCAA with controlling
authority over its members in that it is has the ultimate responsibility
for ensuring that the members conform with the bylaws and the
constitution of the NCAA. See id. Furthermore, Judge McKee
criticized the majority for looking "at Tarkanian through the wrong
end of the telescope" by utilizing the Supreme Court's finding that
the NCAA was not a state actor to conclude that the NCAA is not
vested with sufficient control over its members to become subject to
Title VI liability. Id. at 124 (McKee, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The judge pointed out that the focus in
Tarkanian was on whether the NCAA was transformed into a state
actor via the state university's actions, while the critical inquiry in this
case should be whether the NCAA exerts sufficient control over its
members such that they are coerced to act in conformity with the
wishes of the NCAA. See id. Judge McKee emphasized that it would
be anomalous to find that that UNLV had transformed the NCAA
into a state actor by complying with the NCAA order to suspend their
coach when the university vehemently disagreed with the NCAA's
position on the matter. See id. Therefore, the judge posited that the
facts of Tarkanian, particularly in the context of Division I athletics,
must support the controlling authority theory because it
demonstrates the power the NCAA possesses to force its members to
bend to its will. See id.
Judge McKee then turned to the alter ego theory proposed by
the plaintiffs and commented that, despite the fact that the NYSP
Fund was clearly created in an attempt to insulate the NCAA from
becoming a recipient of federal funds, there still remains the
question of whether the fund is, in effect, a separate entity from the
NCAA. See id. at 125 (McKee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge McKee focused on several factors that tend to suggest
that the NYSP Fund is the alter ego of the NCAA, including: (1) the
Board of Directors for the NYSP Fund is composed entirely of NCAA
employees; (2) all decisions for the NYSP Fund are made by the NYSP
Committee, which is a constituent of the NCAA; (3) the NYSP Fund
does not follow any corporate procedures; and (4) in 1993, the
NCAA submitted to the Department of Health and Human Services
on behalf of the NYSP Fund a report specifying the NCAA as the
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grantee of the federal financial assistance to the NYSP. See id, The
judge also acknowledged that certain other factors seemed to
indicate the contrary, including: (1) the NCAA sub-grants all federal
financial assistance to the NYSP Fund to third parties; (2) the NYSP
Fund has at all times remained a distinct entity from the NCAA; and
(3) the NYSP Committee consists of only non-NCAA employees. See
id. at 126 (McKee,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As a
result, Judge McKee argued that the undisputed facts allow for more
than one interpretation of whether the NYSP Fund is the alter ego of
the NCAA, especially in light of the fact that both parties utilize some
identical facts to support their arguments. See id
Finally, Judge McKee chided the majority's Spending Clause
analysis as relying on unproven assumptions and ignoring potential
fact finding that could significantly alter the final determination of
the issue. See id. at 127 (McKee, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). After acknowledging that the Spending Clause commands
discretion in imposing Title VI liability on an entity not receiving
direct federal financial assistance, the judge questioned the majority's
conclusion that a lack of privity exists between the Departments and
the NCAA. See id. In addition, the judge suggested that if the NYSP
Fund is found by a fact finder to be the alter ego of the NCAA, privity
may be established. See id. Finally, the judge postulated that
Congress could not have intended to give member institutions
federal funds only to allow them to sidestep their obligations by
vesting controlling authority of their athletic programs to an entity
not capable of being liable under Title VI. See id.
The Third Circuit, while perhaps evading the difficult
discrimination issue presented, correctly refused to impose Title VI
liability against the NCAA for utilizing the minimum SAT component
of Proposition 16. Judge McKee appears to have misinterpreted the
law by asserting that the NCAA may be liable under the alter ego
theory. As Judge Greenberg pointed out, the NYSP Fund's programs
and activities are not involved in this case. See id. at 116. Thus, the
court correctly decided that, because Title VI regulations are
program-specific and inapplicable to disparate impact discrimination
cases, preclusion of any liability against the NCAA based on the NYSP
Fund's receipt of federal grants is proper. See id. Judge McKee,
however, sets forth a persuasive argument for finding the NCAA to be
a controlling authority over its member institutions based on the
majority's potential misuse of the reasoning in Tarkanian. See id. at
124 (McKee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Nevertheless, the Cureton result was sound in that removing the
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minimum SAT requirement for freshmen eligibility would create an
intolerable effect on Division I schools across the country. Colleges
and universities throughout the nation would exclusively recruit bluechip athletes who can provide the school with big rewards in the form
of tournament prize money, sponsorships, and endorsement deals,
while the student-athlete would become a relic of the past. In doing
so, these institutions would effectively transform their athletic
programs into farm systems for professional sports. While the level of
success of a program can assist immeasurably a college or university
in many ways, these institutions must not be permitted to lose sight of
their educational purpose in recruiting students, not athletes, to
participate on their athletic teams.
Eric W Dittmann

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION-REVERSE DISCRIMINATION IN HIRINGAFFIRMATIE ACTION PLANS WITHOUT A REMEDIAL PURPOSE
ILLEGALLY DISCRIMINATE AGAINST WHITE JOB APPLICANTS-Schurr v.

Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1999).
From 1974 to 1986, Karl C. Schurr, a white male, held a number
of full-time positions with Resorts International Hotel, Inc. (Resorts)
in Atlantic City, New Jersey. See Schurr v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 196
F.3d 486, 490 (3d Cir. 1999). After 1986, Schurr worked for Resorts
as a "casual" employee only when needed. In late 1993, Resorts
suspended a light and sound technician; Schurr substituted for that
employee while arbitration proceedings were pending. At the
conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, the full-time light and
sound technician position became available, and Schurr applied for
the job.
In addition to Schurr, four other persons applied for the
position. Bill Stevenson, the director of show operations and stage
manager, narrowed the pool of applicants to two individuals: Schurr
and Ronald Boykin, a black male. Like Schurr, Boykin was employed
by Resorts as a casual worker, and Stevenson viewed both applicants
as equally qualified for the position. Believing that the Equal
Employment and Business Opportunity Plan (EEBOP) of Resorts
required a minority applicant to be hired because the percentage of
minority employees in the technician category was below the goal set
forth by the Casino Control Commission (CCC), Stevenson offered
the position to Boykin. Schurr, after learning that he had been
passed over for employment in favor of the minority candidate,
continued his work as a casual employee for Resorts as well as for
other Atlantic City casinos.

On July 8, 1996, Schurr commenced an action against the CCC
Chairman and Resorts. See id. at 491. Schurr sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against the Chairman, alleging that his Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated when the Chairman enforced the
CCC's regulations that set minority employment goals and require
casino licensees to effectuate affirmative action plans. See id. In
addition, Schurr alleged that Resorts violated the mandates of Title
VII, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), and the
Fourteenth Amendment when it considered race as a factor in its
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determination not to hire him. See id. at 496.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
CCC Chairman, concluding that Schurr lacked standing to maintain
a claim because he suffered no injury-in-fact. See id. at 491. The
district court concluded that the challenged regulations did not serve
as a barrier to nonminorities or males. See id. at 492. In addition, the
district court determined that Schurr had failed to show a causal
connection between the decision of Resorts to hire a minority
candidate and the regulations promulgated by the CCC. See id. The
district court also granted summary judgment to the defendants on
all statutory claims. See id. at 488.
Judge Mansmann, writing for a unanimous panel, initially
affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment in
favor of the CCC's Chairman, finding that Shurr failed to establish an
imminent injury and thus lacked standing. See id. at 495. Judge
Mansmann, however, reversed the district court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of Resorts, concluding that the
affirmative action plan of Resorts lacked the necessary remedial
purpose required. See id. at 497.
The court began the analysis by exploring the regulatory and
legislative background of the Casino Control Act, by which the CCC
regulates. See id. at 488-89. The court noted that the Casino Control
Act demands that every casino licensee undertake affirmative steps to
provide equal employment opportunities. See id. at 488. Judge
Mansmann noted that the relevant regulations require that casino
licensees take affirmative steps to ensure that minorities, persons with
disabilities, and women are recruited and extended employment
without regard to their minority status, disability, or gender. See id. at
488-89. When casino licensees fall below the applicable employment
goals set forth in New Jersey Administrative Code (Code), the court
observed, casino licensees must increase the number of minorities
and women in positions within Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission job categories. See id. (citing NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19, §

53-4.3(b) (2) (1999)).
Judge Mansmann next addressed the Code's statutory
background, observing that the CCC also bears the responsibility for
monitoring the diversity of the workforce at every licensed casino. See
id. at 489 (discussing N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19, § 53-4.5 & 4.6 (1999)).
The court further noted that each licensed casino must file quarterly
reports detailing the enforcement of affirmative action efforts
regarding its workforce. See id. The court observed that if a casino
fills a position with compensation of $35,000 or more with a white

2000]

SURVEYS

999

male candidate, the casino must then document its affirmative
attempts to promote a minority or woman to that same position. See
id. (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19, § 53-4.5 (1999)). Moreover, the
court explained, if a casino licensee fails to achieve its performance
goals, the casino must document its attempts to implement and
See id. Finally, Judge Mansmann
comply with its EEBOP.
the
CCC
determines that a licensed casino has
acknowledged that if
not complied with the proper mandates, the CCC may impose
sanctions on its licensee. See id. The court underscored that such
sanctions included the imposition of certain conditions upon a
casino's license, suspension, revocation, denial, or refusal to renew
the license, referral for legal action, civil penalties, and other
recourse permitted or authorized by the Code. See id. at 490 (quoting
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19, § 53-6.11 (1999)).
The court subsequently considered whether Schurr had standing
to pursue claims against the CCC's Chairman for injunctive and
declaratory relief. See id. at 491. The court initially set forth the
standing requirements "embodied in the 'case' or 'controversy'
provision of Article III of the United States Constitution." Id. To
satisfy the standing requirements, the court explained, a plaintiff
must be able to demonstrate an injury-in-fact described as "an
invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is ...concrete and
particularized[;] and . . . actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical." Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992)). The court further explained that there must be "a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of" or, in other words, "the injury has to be fairly trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . .the result [of an]

independent action of some third party not before the court." Id.
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). Lastly, the court observed that it
must be "'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculati [on],' that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. (quoting Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560-61).
The court next reviewed the district court's conclusion that
Schurr lacked standing because he failed to demonstrate that he
suffered "an 'injury in fact' within the meaning of Article III." Id. In
particular, the court highlighted the district court's observation that
the regulations at issue had not injured Schurr because the
regulations merely broadened the applicant pool through various
outreach efforts and did not impose a barrier to other persons
competing for a specific position. See id. Additionally, Judge
Mansmann articulated the district court's determination that Schurr
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lacked standing because he failed to illustrate a causal connection
between Resorts' decision to hire a minority applicant and the
challenged regulatory scheme. See id. at 492. Recognizing that the
district court's analysis concerning injury-in-fact and causation rested
heavily on the interpretation of the regulations at issue, the judge
stressed the district court's determination that the challenged
"regulations specifically do not authorize or encourage the use of
preference in hiring, [but] . . . instead . .. specifically provide for
other, much more benign methods by which casino licensees may
expand the applicant pool." Id. (citing Schurr v. Resorts Int'l Hotel,
Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 537, 549-50 (D.N.J. 1998)). The court, however,
expressly rejected the district court's interpretation of the
regulations, contending that the regulatory scheme at issue
"contemplates something beyond 'benign methods by which casino
licensees may expand the applicant pool."' Id. (quoting Schurr v.
Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 537, 550 (D.N.J. 1998)).
Moreover, the court refuted the district court's suggestion that the
regulations are geared toward recruitment alone, finding that such a
determination is inconsistent with the regulation's plain language.
See id.
Nevertheless, Judge Mansmann agreed with the district court's
position that the challenged regulations "do not mandate specific
hiring decisions." Id. at 493. Thejudge, however, determined that in
devising employment goals for minorities and women, monitoring
compliance with such goals, and imposing sanctions when casino
licensees fail to show good-faith attempts to comply with such goals,
the challenged regulations were "intended to influence employment
decisions generally and may... affect concrete decisions." Id. at 492.
The court then concluded that the district court erred in ruling that
Schurr failed to prove causation because the challenged regulations
have the effect of encouraging, or even compelling, discriminatory
hiring. See id. at 494 (examining Bras v. CalforniaPub. Util., 59 F.3d
869 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Judge Mansmann, after asserting that the district court's errors
in characterizing the challenged regulations and determining the
causation issue did not require automatic reversal, began
consideration of the pivotal element of the standing issue-imminent
injury. See id. at 495. The imminent injury component of standing,
the court explained, requires that Schurr demonstrate that he will be
prevented from competing with minority candidates on an equal
basis in the future. See id. The court concluded that Schurr had
failed to demonstrate imminent injury because the evidence
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suggested that since being denied the technician's position in 1994,
he repeatedly had been subjected to the challenged regulations and
suffered no adverse effect. See id. Therefore, Judge Mansmann
affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to the
CCC Chairman based on lack of standing, though for reasons varying
from those of the district court. See id. at 496.
The court then shifted its focus to Schurr's allegation that
Resorts violated Title VII by considering race as a factor in making its
decision not to hire. See id. Initially, the court acknowledged that the
district court engaged in only a cursory analysis of Schurr's Title VII
claim and further observed that appellate courts generally are
discouraged from determining the legality of a challenged affirmative
action program without the aid of a thorough and effective analysis
by the district court. See id. Notwithstanding this warning, Judge
Mansmann determined that the court was dealing with an atypical
case, which warranted review because the record made clear that
"Resorts' plan was not adopted to remedy a manifest imbalance in
traditionally segregated job categories." Id. (emphasis added).
In commencing the court's Title VII analysis, Judge Mansmann
recounted the terms of the statute, stressing that a violation occurs
"when an employer takes action 'to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment."' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a)
(1999)). The judge also articulated that "to limit, segregate, or
classify... employees.., in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
affect his status as an employee on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin" would also violate Title XII. Id. (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a) (1999)). Furthermore, the court explained that,
under certain circumstances, race-based employment decisions made
in accordance with the terms of an affirmative action plan are
permissible under Title VII. See id.
The court then evaluated its prior holding in Taxman v. Board of
Education. See id. (discussing Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547
(3d Cir. 1996)). In Taxman, the court relied on the two-prong test
established by the United States Supreme Court that declared "Title
VII's prohibition against racial discrimination is not violated by
affirmative action plans which . .. [first] 'have purposes that mirror
those of the statute' and second, 'do not unnecessarily trammel the
interests of [nonminority] employees."'
Id.
(quoting United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979)). Judge Mansmann
emphasized the Taxman court's reminder that Title VII was intended
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to prevent discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin and to remedy the ill-effects of past discrimination in
the American workforce. See id.
Emphasizing the remedial purpose of Tide VII, the court
recalled the rule set forth by the Taxman court, stating that "'[u]nless
an affirmative action plan has a remedial purpose, it cannot be said
to mirror the purposes of the statute, and, therefore, cannot satisfy
the first prong of the Weber test."' Id. at 496-97 (quoting Taxman, 91
F.3d at 1556). Explaining that Schurr had established a prima facie
case of employment discrimination on the basis of race and further
recognizing that Resorts based its decision not to employ Schurr on
its affirmative action policy, the court concluded that the dispositive
issue of liability is the validity of the affirmative action policy of
Resorts under Title VII.
See id. at 497. Moreover, the court
determined that the burden of production now shifted to Resorts to
show a nondiscriminatory legitimate reason for the hiring decision.
See id. n.l1 (citing McDonnellDouglasv. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
In analyzing the casino's affirmative action plan, Judge
Mansmann determined that the plan lacked the remedial purpose
required by controlling precedent, which rendered the plan invalid.
See id. at 497-98. The court found the plan deficient because neither
the plan nor the regulations were based on any showing of past or
present discrimination in the casino industry or in the job category
encompassing technicians. See id. at 498. The court concluded that
the plan also failed because the plan was not implemented in light of
any manifest imbalance nor was it effected in response to a
determination that ajob category was affected by segregation. See id.
Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of
Schurr on his Tide VII claim. See id.
The court next addressed Schurr's remaining statutory claims.
See id. The court stated that the disposition of Schurr's Tide VII
claim likewise warranted reversal of the district court's decision that
granted summary judgment for Resorts regarding Schurr's claims
under the LAD and § 1981 of tide 42 of the United States Code. See
id. The court determined that because the analysis regarding a Tide
VII action virtually mirrors that of a claim made under the LAD, any
examination of Schurr's claims under the LAD would inevitably
produce the same result as that reached under Tide VII. See id.
Moreover, as to Schurr's claim based on § 1981, the court
emphasized that "'the elements of employment discrimination under
Tide VII are identical to the elements of a section 1981 claim."' Id. at
499 (quoting Schurr, 16 F.Supp.2d at 566). Consequently, because
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Schurr was entitled to summary judgment on his Title VII claim, the
court determined that summary judgment of Schurr's § 1981 claim
was appropriate. See id. Finally, the court remanded the matter to
the district court for consideration of the issue of damages. See id.
The Third Circuit's strict interpretation of antidiscrimination
law in Schurrwill likely affect how and whether employers will adopt
affirmative action plans in the future. In the wake of Schurr,
employers who voluntarily adopt affirmative action plans could
become subject to reverse discrimination suits if their plans lack the
necessary remedial purpose as articulated by the Third Circuit.
Conversely, in light of Schurr, those employers who have no choice
but to abide by regulations that require the implementation and
maintenance of affirmative action plans may face litigation if their
plans are flawed. In either situation, the Third Circuit has raised the
stakes in the design and implementation of affirmative action plans,
requiring employers to remain faithful to the goals underlying Tide
VII or suffer the consequences.
PatriciaA. Dulinski

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-COPYRIGHT ACTMISCHARACrERIZATION OF THE NATURE OF AUTHORSHIP OF A WORK
ON A COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION
CONSTITUTES A MATERIAL
MISSTATEMENT IF THE ERROR RESULTS IN CLAIMING A COPYRIGHTABLE
INTEREST IN A WORK NOT AUTHORED BY THE APPLICANT-Raquel v.

EducationMgmt. Comp., 196 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1999).
Raquel, a partnership of songwriters and musicians, composed
the music, arrangement, and lyrics for a song entitled "Pop Goes the
Music." See Raquel v. Education Mgmt. Corp., 196 F.3d 171, 173 (3d Cir.
1999). Raquel granted a license for the use of this song and its
performance to Education Management Corporation (EMC) and
Elias/Savion Advertising Agency, Inc. (Elias/Savion). The license
provided that for three years Elias/Savion could use the song and
Raquel's performance in a television commercial to advertise the
educational programs of Art Institutes International, which EMC
manages. In exchange for the license, Elias produced for Raquel a
music video containing the song. Elias/Savion authored both the
music video and the commercial.
To bring an action for infringement, as required under the
Copyright Act, Raquel applied for a federal copyright registration for
"Pop Goes the Music" in July of 1995. See id. at 173, 175. On the
application, Raquel classified its work as "audiovisual" and indicated
that it authored the song's music, lyrics, and arrangement. See id. at
173-74. With its registration form, Raquel submitted copies of the
music video and the commercial. See id. at 174.
In October 1995, Raquel brought a copyright infringement suit
against defendants EMC, Geffen Records, and the musical band
Nirvana in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. See id. In its complaint, Raquel claimed that EMC
breached the licensing agreement by broadcasting the commercial
beyond the agreed-upon three-year period. See id. Raquel also
alleged that EMC's agreement with Geffen Records and Nirvana,
which allowed a fragment of the commercial containing Raquel's
song to be used in a Nirvana music video, violated Raquel's copyright.
See id. EMC then impleaded Elias/Savion, which successfully moved
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. The court
reasoned that Raquel did not own a copyrightable interest in either
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the music video or the commercial, which formed the basis of its
infringement claim, because Elias/Savion authored both. See id. The
court also noted that Raquel's classification of its work as
"audiovisual" was inadvertent and that this mischaracterization did
not render the copyright in the song itself invalid. See id. at 175.
Because Raquel's error was considered innocent, the court did not
grant attorney's fees to Elias/Savion. See id. at 174.
In December 1996, Raquel submitted a supplemental
registration form to the Register of Copyrights in which it indicated
that the nature of its authorship included its performance of the song
"Pop Goes the Music." See id. This supplemental filing contained no
other additions or corrections. See id. Later that month, in an
attempt to "amplify" its earlier filing, Raquel submitted additional
videos of its performance, along with a second supplemental
registration form stating that the original filing included "items as to
which claimant does not assert copyright." Id.
The next week, Raquel filed another complaint in the federal
district court that again alleged copyright infringement, but based
the claim of infringement upon the song itself, not the commercial
containing the song. See id. at 174-75. Again, the court dismissed the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that neither the
original application nor the supplemental filings were adequate to
sustain the infringement claim. See id. at 175. Raquel appealed the
district court's decision. See id.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of the case, holding that mischaracterization of the nature
of authorship of a work on a copyright registration, such that a
copyrightable interest is claimed in a work not authored by the
applicant, constitutes a material misstatement that cannot confer
jurisdiction in a suit for infringement of the work. See id. at 177, 182.
Judge Sloviter, writing for the majority, first addressed Raquel's
argument that the court was bound by the district court's
determination in the first suit that the original filing was a sufficient
registration of the song. See id. at 175. While conceding that the
district court's language can be construed as stating that Raquel had
a valid registered copyright in the song, the judge asserted that the
court was not bound by findings of the district court in the first
lawsuit because that decision was not the one on appeal. See id.
Furthermore, Judge Sloviter added that because the lower court
based its dismissal of the case on the determination that Raquel had
no copyrightable interest in the work that formed the basis of the
claim, the lower court's statement concerning the validity of the
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registration of the song was "at most dictum." See id.
The court next discussed Raquel's argument that the
characterization of its work as an "audiovisual" work was inadvertent
and immaterial and, therefore, should not prohibit an action for
infringement of the song. See id. at 176. Judge Sloviter stated that an
applicant's knowing omission of material information will invalidate a
copyright registration, rendering the plaintiff unable to sustain a
claim for infringement. See id. (citing Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v.
Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 667 (3d Cir. 1990)). The court
contrasted this situation from one in which the omission was
inadvertent, suggesting that the latter circumstances should not bar a
plaintiff from filing a copyright infringement action. See id. (citing
Masquerade, 912 F.2d at 668 n.5). Additionally, the majority noted
that other courts have excused inaccuracies on copyright registration
forms if the error was both immaterial and inadvertent. See id. at 178
(citing Thomas Wilson & Co. v. IrvingJ Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409 (2d
Cir. 1970); Wales Indus. v. Hasbro Bradley, Inc., 612 F.Supp. 510
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Testa v. Janssen, 492 F.Supp. 198 (W.D. Pa 1980)).
The majority, however, did not resolve the question of whether
inadvertent, but material, misstatements would bar an infringement
suit, concluding that the error by Raquel was both material and
knowing. See id. at 177.
The court subsequently noted that the proper test for
determining the materiality of an error on a copyright registration is
to determine if the error would have led the Copyright Office to
decline the registration. See id. (citing Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman
Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1161 (1st Cir. 1994)). The court
further indicated that, typically, material misstatements are those that
would have led to the refusal of the registration. See id. In
considering the question of whether Raquel's designation of its song
as an audiovisual work was material, Judge Sloviter underscored the
clear facial differences between audiovisual works and songs. See id.
The judge stated that Raquel's designation of "Pop Goes the Music"
as an audiovisual work would likely have resulted in the rejection of
its application because the effect of this inaccuracy was to claim
authorship in a work that it did not create. See id. at 177-78. The
court concluded that Raquel's mischaracterization was clearly
material because it misidentified the work itself. See id. Judge
Sloviter stressed that no other cases have excused applicants for
errors on copyright registration forms when the applicant attempted
to register a work in which it had no copyrightable interest. See id. at
178. The court further emphasized the importance of providing
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proper notice to the Copyright Office regarding the nature of the
work for which protection is sought and avoiding the likelihood of
confusion. See id. at 178-79.
The court next rejected Raquel's contention that the inaccuracy
on its copyright registration form was inadvertent. See id. at 179. The
court found it difficult to conclude that Raquel's error was innocent
based on evidence in record that did not indicate that Raquel's
intention was to obtain copyright protection for the song. See id.
First, Judge Sloviter noted that the same attorney who completed the
registration for Raquel, including the mischaracterization of its work
as audiovisual, later filed the complaint that alleged infringement of
Raquel's copyright in the video and the commercial. See id. The
judge also observed that Raquel stated on its registration form that its
work was created in 1991, corresponding to the completion date of
the video and commercial but not the song, further suggesting that
Raquel did not attempt to obtain a registered copyright in the song.
See id. The court emphasized that Raquel filed the second complaint
based on infringement of the song despite the fact that it failed to file
a new registration form accurately claiming authorship of the song
after the first lawsuit was dismissed. See id.
Judge Sloviter next analyzed Raquel's argument that it obtained
a valid registered copyright of its performance of the song as a result
of the supplemental filings and, therefore, that the district court has
subject matter jurisdiction based on this copyright. See id. at 180.
The judge explained that it is possible to obtain separate copyrights
on the performance of a song (a "sound recording copyright"), and
the song itself (a "musical work copyright"). See id. The judge,
however, declared that Raquel's purported copyright of its
performance was inadequate to sustain an action for infringement of
that performance. See id.
In deciding if Raquel held a valid registered copyright of the
performance of its song, the court enumerated the two purposes of
supplemental registration, as set forth in the Code of Federal
Regulations. See id. First, the court noted that a supplemental
registration may be used to correct an inaccurate filing if the error is
not the type that should have been recognized by the Copyright
Office. See id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 201.5(b) (2) (i) (1999)). Second, the
court stated that a supplemental registration may be used to amplify a
filing when basic information was omitted from the original
registration or when certain facts, unrelated to ownership, have
changed since the original registration was filed. See id. (citing 37
C.F.R. § 201.5(b)(2)(ii) (1999)). By way of contrast, the court
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highlighted uses of supplemental registrations that are improper,
such as to change the owner of the copyright after the original filing
or to "'reflect changes in the content of a work."' Id. at 180-81
(quoting 37 C.F.R. § 201.5(b) (2) (iii) (1999)).
Next, the majority compared the enumerated functions of a
supplemental registration with Raquel's attempt to use its subsequent
registration forms to specify a different nature of the work for which
it sought copyright protection. See id. at 181. According to Judge
Sloviter, Raquel's intended use of its two supplemental registrations
corresponds to a use that is deemed inappropriate by the Code of
Federal Regulations. See id. The judge maintained that Raquel did
not attempt to correct inaccurate information, supplement omitted
information, or change facts with its supplemental filings. See id.
Rather, the judge maintained that changing the nature of its work
from an "audiovisual" work to a "performance" was similar to
changing the content of the work, which is prohibited. See id,
Relying on statutory language stating that supplemental filings may
only be used to augment the original, the court likewise disagreed
with Raquel's view that the supplemental filings should supersede the
original registration. See id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 408(d) (1999)).
Finally, Judge Sloviter commented that even if the supplemental
registrations were sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction,
Raquel's complaint was facially flawed and, thus, incapable of
supporting the infringement action. See id. More specifically, the
judge observed that the pleadings alleged infringement of a
copyright of the song itself, which Raquel had not obtained, but
failed to allege infringement of a copyright of the performance of
that song. See id. The court asserted that a motion to dismiss should
be granted "[w] here there is a fatal flaw on the face of a complaint
that purports to assert an infringement action[.]" Id. (quoting
Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir.
1988)). Lastly, the court reiterated that Raquel had not obtained a
valid copyright registration in its performance and, consequently,
cannot amend its complaint to allege infringement of that work. See
id. at 182.
Judge Alito, in dissent, criticized the majority's holding by
stating that it "elevate[d] form over substance[.]" Id. (Alito, J.,
dissenting). Initially, Judge Alito found unpersuasive the majority's
argument that the district court's prior findings from the first lawsuit
were not binding.
See id.
The judge enumerated three
determinations of the district court that were entitled to deference:
(1) that Raquel's intention was to register its song and not the video;
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(2) that, on the registration form, Raquel's designation of its work as
"audiovisual" was inadvertent; and (3) that Raquel had obtained a
valid registration of the song itself. See id. at 182-83 (Alito, J.,
dissenting). Because the inadvertence issue had to be considered
before denying attorney's fees to Elias/Savion, the judge disputed the
majority's presumption that these findings were not necessary to the
district court's holding and were merely dictum. See id. at 183 (Alito,
J., dissenting).
Judge Alito stressed that without taking into account proper
prudential considerations, the law of the case doctrine prohibits
reconsidering previous decisions "by the same judge in the same case
or a closely related one." Id. (quoting Casey v. Planned Parenthoodof
Southeastern Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 856 n.lI (3d Cir. 1994)). The judge
noted that these prudential considerations were clearly lacking in this
case because the majority's decision not to follow the district court's
determination on the validity of Raquel's registration of its song
prejudiced the plaintiff, who relied on this finding. See id. Judge
Alito added that relitigating the issues of inadvertence and validity,
which were specifically decided in the earlier lawsuit, is also
prohibited by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See id. at 184 (Alito,
J., dissenting) (citing Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Federal Emergency Mgrmt.
Agency, 126 F.3d 461, 475 (3d Cir. 1997)).
The dissent further insisted that Raquel had indeed obtained a
valid registered copyright of its song. See id. Judge Alito indicated
that the applicable rule of law is that innocent errors on copyright
registration forms do not prohibit infringement actions unless the
defendant detrimentally relied on the error or evidence shows that
the plaintiff intended to defraud the Copyright Office. See id. (citing
UrantiaFound. v. Maaherra,114 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 1997)). The
dissent stressed that no court has held that inadvertent errors on
copyright registrations, including errors defining the nature of the
work, prohibit infringement actions if the applicant could have
obtained a valid copyright if the application was correct. See id.
The dissent
(citing Masquerade Novelty, 912 F.2d at 668 n.5).
subsequently claimed that Raquel's registration would have been
acceptable if the registration had accurately described the nature of
the work. See id. at 185 (Alito, J., dissenting). Judge Alito also noted
that the majority never implied that the inaccuracy in Raquel's
registration form somehow prejudiced the defendants. See id. The
dissent concluded that the inaccuracy did not present the court with
grounds for dismissing the case. See id.
Finally, Judge Alito argued that the majority's holding was
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improperly based in part on its own factual finding that Raquel's
registration form was essentially fraudulent. See id. According to the
judge, this finding clearly ignores the wealth of evidence supporting
the notion that Raquel's misstatement was inadvertent. See id. As an
example, the judge noted that Raquel's registration form correctly
identified the work as "Pop Goes the Music," which the song is named
and not "Before the Crowd Roars," which the commercial is named.
See id. Additionally, the dissent pointed out that Raquel correctly
claimed authorship in the music, lyrics, and arrangements on the
application. See id. The judge declared that these facts evidenced a
clear intent by Raquel to obtain copyright protection in the song. See
id. Judge Alito further explained that the use of the designation
"audiovisual" work on the registration form likely resulted from the
confusion of Raquel's counsel arising because the song was fixed on a
videotape. See id. at 185-86 (Alito, J., dissenting). The dissent
concluded its argument by noting that the majority's finding that
Raquel's error was not inadvertent ignores the well-settled principle
that in considering a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff should receive
the benefit of the doubt and the factual allegations of the complaint
should be taken as true. See id. at 186 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
In upholding the decision of the district court to dismiss this
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court correctly
concluded that inaccuracies on copyright registration forms that are
both purposeful and material should bar an infringement action.
This rule ensures that applicants who possess a fraudulent intent in
dealing with the Copyright Office will be penalized and further serves
a preventive function. By setting forth a clear rule that misidentifying
the nature of the work for which copyright protection is sought is a
material error, this decision will provide a strong incentive for
applicants to ensure their work is properly identified.
Although the court's ruling will provide guidance to the lower
courts when faced with similar facts, it leaves open the question of
whether material errors will be excused if they are inadvertent.
Because the court does not present clear guidelines as to what kind of
behavior evidences inadvertence, the effect of this decision may be to
deny potential copyright holders of their day in court when faced
with infringement actions simply because of an inadvertent error in
designating their work. Additionally, the majority's holding was
unnecessarily harsh considering the conflicting interpretations of the
evidence with respect to the plaintiffs intent. The court seems to
have equated an applicant's mischaracterization of the nature of its
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work with a fraudulent desire to obtain a registered copyright in a
work that it did not author. This decision may ultimately result in
limiting the copyright protection of works simply because a mistake
was made on the registration form.
Alysia A. Finnegan

EMPLOYMENT LAW-REVERSE DISCRIMINATION-TITLE VII DOES
NOT REQUIRE A PARTY ALLEGING REVERSE DISCRIMINATION TO
PROVIDE
EVIDENCE
OF BACKGROUND
CIRCUMSTANCES
TO
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE EMPLOYER UNJUSTLY DISCRIMINATES
AGAINST THE MAJORITY TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-Iadimaro v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151
(3d Cir. 1999).
In 1992, the United States Postal Service conducted a massive
reorganization that consolidated or eliminated numerous executivelevel posts. See Iadimarcov. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 154 (3d Cir. 1999).
During this time, Charles Iadimarco, a white male managerial
employee, was forced to tender a 991 Form indicating his preference
for other Postal Service positions.
Having satisfied the initial
requirements delineated by the Postal Service, ladimarco submitted a
991 Form expressing interest in the Manager of In-Plant Support
(MIPS) position at three different locations. Although two of the
three facilities had already filled the MIPS position, Iadimarco
contacted the hiring official at the remaining plant to inquire about
that plant's MIPS situation. Of the forty-one applicants, Iadimarco
was the only candidate to achieve a superior rating in every category
listed in the "knowledge, skills and abilities" (KSA) matrix that the
Postal Service uses to assess applicants.
In March 1993, after being interviewed by a hiring official,
Iadimarco was led to believe that he had secured the MIPS position,
subject merely to the approval of the official's supervisor. Shortly
thereafter, however, the hiring official re-posted the MIPS position.
Prior to the official selection of the new MIPS, Iadimarco
begrudgingly accepted the inferior position of an Operations
Support Specialist (OSS). See id. at 155. Iadimarco's decision to
accept the OSS position was prompted by the supervisor's earlier
distribution of a "diversity memo," which stressed the importance of a
diverse management reflecting the composition of a plant's
workforce and by Iadimarco's sense of the pervasive racial overtones
precluding his immediate appointment as the MIPS. The Postal
Service, citing concern over ladimarco's promotion by default due to
the absence of other equally qualified applicants, re-opened the
hiring process and ultimately hired Toni Williams, a black female, as
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the new MIPS, despite her comparatively inferior credentials. See id.
at 154-55.
On March 28, 1993, Iadimarco launched proceedings before the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against the
Postal Service, alleging that the MIPS hiring decision rested
exclusively on improper gender and racial considerations. See id. at
155. In essence, Iadimarco argued that he was illegally deprived of
the MIPS position because he was a white male. See id. The
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)agreed, finding that Iadimarco was
See id.
the victim of illegal gender and race discrimination.
the
EEOC
rejected
the
Notwithstanding the ALJ's determination,
ALJ's finding and concluded that, because Iadimarco had accepted
another position prior to being officially denied the MIPS position,
he fell short of establishing "a prima facie case of discrimination." Id.
Following the EEOC's ruling, Iadimarco filed suit against the Postal
Service in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey. See id. ladimarco alleged that the Postal Service violated Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by engaging in illegal racial
discrimination. See id. The district court, however, disagreed and
granted summary judgment for the Postal Service. See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the district court's ruling, stating that various fact questions
precluded the issuance of summary judgment. See id. at 154.
Specifically, the Third Circuit held that, because a prima facie case
alleging reverse discrimination does not require the claimant to
establish "background circumstances" evidencing that the defendant
was the "unusual employer" who wantonly discriminated against the
majority, Iadimarco had demonstrated a prima facie case of racial
discrimination under Title VII. See id. at 151, 154. Moreover, the
court refuted the district court's alternative reasoning that, even if
the plaintiff had set forth a prima facie case, the defendant provided
a viable race-neutral rationale for the hiring decision. See id. at 154.
Referencing the defendant's proffered explanation regarding its
ultimate hiring decision, the court concluded that a question of fact
was raised as to whether that explanation was simply a pretext for
illegal racial discrimination. See id.
Judge McKee, writing for a unanimous panel, commenced the
opinion by delving into the supporting rationales upon which the
district court relied in the summaryjudgment opinion. See id. at 156.
As an initial matter, the court accepted the district court's
observation that, although the hiring official and his supervisor were
black, the particular race of the those charged with filling the
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challenged MIPS position, while certainly relevant, was not, by itself,
sufficient to establish discrimination. See id. More importantly, Judge
McKee admitted that the Third Circuit previously had not had the
opportunity to fashion the proper guidance for establishing a prima
facie case of reverse discrimination. See id. at 157.
Seizing the opportunity to establish uniform guideposts
regarding establishment of a prima facie case of reverse
discrimination, the court began by surveying the existing law
underlying a Title VII discrimination claim. See id. Judge McKee
noted that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
direct evidence of discriminatory practices is often unavailable
because employers rarely make explicit discriminatory intentions or
policies. See id. The judge observed that the Supreme Court,
therefore, has created the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
approach to enable plaintiffs to proceed with alleged discrimination
claims under Title VII, notwithstanding the absence of direct proof,
when common sense suggests that some form of discrimination has
occurred. See id.
The court then carefully outlined the elements needed to
establish the "ordinary case" for prima facie discrimination. See id.
The "ordinary case," the court explained, occurs when a minority
plaintiff alleges racially motivated employment discrimination. See id.
Judge McKee elucidated that, under the McDonnell Douglas rubric, a
minority plaintiff must carry the initial statutory burden of setting
forth a prima facie case for race-based discrimination by
demonstrating (1) that he inheres to a cognizable racial minority; (2)
that he was qualified and, as a result, applied for a position for which
the prospective employer was actively seeking applicants; (3) that, in
spite of his qualifications, he was turned down; and (4) that,
following his rejection, the job remained available, and the employer
endeavored to seek additional applicants who seemingly shared the
same qualifications as the complainant. See id. (citing McDonnell
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
Following the plaintiffs establishment of a prima facie case,
Judge McKee explained, the burden shifts to the employer to provide
some nondiscriminatory, legitimate reason for refusing to hire the
employee. See id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). The
court further articulated that, if the employer proffers any evidence
demonstrating a justifiable, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection, then the employee must be given the
opportunity to prove that the employer's proffered justification was a
mere pretext for illegal race-based employment discrimination. See

20001

SURVEYS

1015

id. at 157-58 (citing McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 804).
Having demarcated the principles governing the predominant
number of race-related employment discrimination cases, the court
then enunciated the doctrinal challenge underlying cases of reverse
discrimination. See id. at 158. The court explained that white
plaintiffs claiming "reverse discrimination" will immediately fail
McDonnell Douglas's literal requirement of belonging to a racial
minority. See id. While it is clear that the edict of Title VII prohibits
all forms of racially motivated employment discrimination regardless
of the employee's particular race, Judge McKee observed that courts
have struggled to craft an appropriate and comparable burdenshifting framework to apply to reverse discrimination.. See id. Judge
McKee noted that circuit courts have promulgated a "background
circumstances" approach under which a white plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant is "that unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority," in place of establishing minority
group status. Id. (quoting Parker v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 652 F.2d
1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
Judge McKee further recounted the modified "background
circumstances" analysis that identified two distinct categories: (1)
evidence denoting that the particular employer has a reason or some
inclination to discriminate maliciously against white persons, and (2)
evidence indicating the existence of something "fishy" about the
particular facts at hand giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
See id. at 159 (citing Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir.
1993)).
The court noted Harding's emphatic decree that the
"background circumstances" test was merely a substitute for the first
prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework and, therefore, was not
intended to be construed as placing a heightened burden on white
plaintiffs alleging reverse discrimination. See id. (citing Harding, 9
F.3d at 154). On the contrary, Judge McKee noted that other courts
have concluded that the "background circumstances" approach does
raise the bar for white plaintiffs. See id. Referencing the inherent
unfairness of imposing such an onerous burden on one party but not
the other, the judge observed that those courts expressing such
criticisms of the "background circumstances" substitute have likewise
rejected it. See id. (citing Eastridgev. Rhode Island College, 996 F. Supp.
161, 161 (D.R.I. 1998)). The Third Circuit further surveyed another
decision that specifically characterized the "unusual employer" aspect
of the "background circumstances" inquiry as an arbitrary barrier that
simply frustrates those claimants who have legitimate Title VII
discrimination claims. See id. (citing Collins v. School Dist. of Kansas
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City, 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (W.D. Mo. 1990)).
Notwithstanding
the
misgivings
of the
"background
circumstances" analysis, Judge McKee stated that, for the courts that
have adopted this test, its application and interpretation have proven
routinely difficult. See id. at 160. To illustrate the point, Judge
McKee described an apparent ambiguity in which the Sixth Circuit
seemingly endorsed
the utilization of the "background
circumstances" approach, but, nine years later openly criticized the
soundness of the test by citing its unfair imposition of varying burden
standards for claimants differentiated only by their race or gender.
See id. (comparing Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63,
67 (6th Cir. 1985) with Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d
796, 801 n.7 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Noting the district court's adoption of the "background
circumstances" test to the case at hand, Judge McKee explicitly
rejected its application to reverse discrimination cases within the
Third Circuit. See id. Rather, in returning to the fundamental
teachings of McDonnellDouglas, the judge emphasized that the central
focus of any discrimination inquiry is always whether the defendant
treated certain people less favorably in light of their race or gender.
See id. (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
Accordingly, the court posited that the only requirement for a prima
facie case in the reverse discrimination context should be that the
plaintiff present evidence that the employer treated some people
different or less favorably based upon a protected characteristic
delineated by Title VII. See id. at 161. The prima facie framework
established in McDonnellDouglas, observed the court, was never meant
to be mechanical, rigid, or ritualistic. See id. (citing U.S. Postal Ser.
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)). Consequently,
Judge McKee found that, because of the heightened and problematic
burden created by the "background circumstances" analysis, such a
test subverts McDonnell Douglas principles. See id.
Judge McKee subsequently questioned the "background
circumstances" requirement that forces the plaintiff to present initial
proofs that the "employer discriminates against the majority," when,
under the appropriate McDonnell Douglas analysis, such evidence
would only be relevant to rebut the defendant's explanation of the
contested conduct. Id. Additionally, the judge highlighted the
mandate of Harding,which called for a member of the majority to
provide evidence that racial animus motivated the employer's actions.
See id. The court postulated that such a modification to McDonnell
Douglas's burden-shifting analysis can undermine the essential point
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of making it easier for plaintiffs to file claims. See id. Mindful of the
Supreme Court's intent to eliminate employment decisions tainted by
discrimination and to place the burden on the party with the easiest
access to information, the Third Circuit announced that the
"background circumstances" test strays too far in altering the prima
facie requirements for a reverse discrimination case. See id.
Judge McKee further emphasized that the "background
circumstances" doctrine is overly vague and ill-defined. See id. The
judge explained that, while some courts have adopted this concept
subject to certain adjustments, such modifications have effectively
rendered the doctrine unnecessary. See id. Judge McKee illustrated
this contention by referencing a Tenth Circuit decision in which the
court validated the use of the "background circumstances" test, while
alternatively approving the utilization of direct or indirect evidence
to substantiate
a reasonable probability of employment
discrimination. See id. at 162 (citing Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971
F.2d 585, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1992)). The Third Circuit concluded
that, because this alternative allows a white male to prove a
reasonable probability of discrimination by submitting direct or
indirect evidence, there is no reason to require the establishment of
background circumstances. See id.
Continuing to identify the inconsistencies associated with the
concept of "background circumstances," the court next reviewed the
plausible contention that the test, by its very language, demands that
the evidence be grounded in the defendant's background. See id.
Judge McKee maintained that this, by itself, raises the bar for a
reverse discrimination plaintiff. See id. The court disparaged the
inability to attach a clear and concise definition to "background
circumstances," as demonstrated by case law. See id. at 162-63. For
example, Judge McKee observed situations in which courts
substituted the "background circumstances" dictate with a simple
requirement that a white plaintiff prove that he belonged to a "class,"
without ever actually defining the class to which the courts were
referring. See id. at 163 (citing Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301, 304
(11th Cir. 1991)).
The Third Circuit, therefore, stressed the
problematic nature of such an ill-defined concept. See id. Indeed,
although everyone belongs to some form of "class," the court
forewarned that the practical effect of substituting membership in a
tenuous class for membership within an identifiable minority group is
the equivalent of eliminating the first requirement of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis. See id.
Moreover, because of the undefined nature of "background
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circumstances," the court expressed the concern that juries may
become confused. See id. Indeed, the judge explained that, under
the McDonnell Douglas framework, the introduction of "background
circumstance"-type evidence is normally reserved for the pretext stage
of the overlying inquiry. See id. Along this line of reasoning, Judge
McKee characterized the ill-conceived substitution of the
"background circumstances" test as, in effect, "cramming" it into
McDonnell Douglas's first requirement. See id. Such an effort,
continued the judge, may require the premature introduction of
"pretextual" evidence among the initial evidence. See id. The court
criticized this result as creating the "heightened burden" unjustly
imposed upon reverse discrimination claimants. See id. Accordingly,
Judge McKee concluded that a reverse discrimination plaintiff filing
suit under Title VII can set forth a prima facie case, despite the lack
of direct evidence of discrimination, by providing evidence that
would allow a jury to find that the employer treated the plaintiff "less
favorably than others because of [his] race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." Id. (citing Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577).
Having established the prevailing standard governing cases of
reverse discrimination, Judge McKee addressed the specific facts
substantiating the lower court's ultimate conclusion. See id. at 164.
The court recognized that the plaintiff was the only candidate for the
Manager of In-Plant Support position who achieved a "superior"
rating in each of the respective knowledge, skills, and abilities
categories. See id. The court noted, in contrast, that the black female
whom the Postal Service hired had never been assessed by such an
objective evaluation. See id. Judge McKee then suggested that the
hiring official's decision to offer the job to a candidate with no KSA
rating raised suspicions relating to the reasons underlying such a
hiring decision. See id.
Moreover, Judge McKee observed that, despite the expressed
concern of hiring the plaintiff by "default" due to a lack of qualified
competition, the hiring official recruited only one non-KSA-rated
applicant, rather than the plethora of other capable candidates. See
id. Continuing with the assessment, the court also noted that
Williams had submitted her application after the established
deadline. See id. The judge further identified the plaintiffs previous
experience as a Manager of In-Plant Support, while noting the
absence of such invaluable experience from Williams's credentials.
See id. More significantly, Judge McKee observed that, while the
plaintiff possessed an engineering degree and the requisite
background for the MIPS position, Williams did not. See id. The
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court openly questioned the defendant's abandonment of the
engineering background requirement when Williams's candidacy
emerged. See id.
Next, the court focused on the supervisor's issuance of the
diversity memo. See id. Judge McKee explained that, although the
diversity memo alone does not single-handedly establish a case of
discrimination, all inferences must be drawn in favor of the plaintiff
as the nonmovant in a summary judgment motion.
See id.
Consequently, the court posited that the supervisor did write, sign,
and distribute the memorandum, despite his flagrant attempt to
distance himself from the directive. See id. The court maintained
that such an attempt to deny authorship was consistent with the
plaintiff's allegation of bias. See id. Similarly, the judge proffered
that, not unlike the supervisor's botched attempt to deny the memo,
the hiring official's denial that he ever conducted an interview of the
plaintiff, but merely engaged in a conversation, added credence to
the plaintiffs allegation. See id.
Judge McKee also disputed the district court's contention that,
because the hiring official had only hired white supervisors prior to
Williams, he did not actively discriminate against whites applying for
managerial posts. See id. at 165. The court, however, noted that the
inquiry does not focus on the discrimination of whites generally, but
rather, on whether the plaintiff individually was the target of
discrimination. See id.
Furthermore, the court refused to acknowledge the defendant's
assertion that the plaintiff's discrimination claim must fail because
the plaintiff accepted another job before the MIPS position was
officially filled. See id. The court underscored the absurdity of the
defendant's argument. See id. Cognizant that the plaintiff took
another position having recognized that racial discrimination was
governing the challenged hiring decision, the court maintained that
the defendant's assertion would allow an employer freely to
discriminate until the victim is compelled to take another position.
See id. Such a result, the judge contended, would reward the
discriminatory tactics of an employer by allowing it simply to argue
that the victim voluntarily removed himself from a position to allege
discrimination. See id. Thus, the Third Circuit overruled the lower
court's determination that the plaintiff had not established illegal
race discrimination under Title VII. See id.
In conclusion, Judge McKee contested the district court's
alternative justification that, even if a prima facie case of
discrimination was established, the defendant provided an unbiased
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explanation for hiring a black female and that the plaintiff failed to
present adequate evidence of pretext to refute it. See id. Reiterating
the standard for defeating summary judgment, the court stated that
the plaintiffs rebuttal evidence, which attacked the defendant's
proffered justifications, must allow a jury reasonably to determine
that the employer's reasoning was either fabricated or otherwise was
not the motivating factor underlying the employment decision. See
id. at 165-66 (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)).
The court explained that such evidence may show implausibilities,
inconsistencies, or contradictions in the employer's supposedly
legitimate justifications. See id. at 166 (citing Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765).
Consequently, Judge McKee announced that when such evidence
demonstrates that the employer's proposed justification was simply a
pretext for discrimination, summary judgment must fail. See id. The
court ascertained that a reasonable jury could deduce that the
defendant's explanation was a mere pretext for illegal racial
discrimination. See id. More specifically, the court refused to validate
the defendant's proffered explanation that Williams was "the right
person for the job." Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that,
because a biased decision-maker could sincerely believe that a certain
class was more suited for a particular position, such a shallow
explanation cannot masquerade as the race-neutral reason behind a
challenged hiring decision. See id.
The decision in Iadimarcowas crucial for several reasons. First,
the promulgation of a well-reasoned and uniform framework will
enable trial courts to analyze properly cases of reverse discrimination.
With a clear standard of evaluation, trial courts should no longer
struggle with the arbitrary and amorphous substitutions that have
obscured decisions of other courts. Second, this decision preserves
and advances the doctrinal underpinnings of Title VII; employment
discrimination, for whatever the motivation, will not be tolerated,
whether on the basis of skin color, race, religion, or gender.
Discriminatory employers can no longer hide behind the legal
technicalities and confusion that previously heightened the burden
requirements for a white male victim of discrimination. Lastly, all
victims of employment discrimination may now enjoy the same
protection envisioned by the drafters of Title VII. In the end, the
Third Circuit has provided a polished procedural tool to aid in the
necessary eradication of employment discrimination.
Samuel E. Peckham

FIRST AMENDMENT-AcCESS TO PUBLIC MEETINGS-A TOWNSHIP'S
RESOLUTION PROHIBITING VIDEOTAPING OF A PUBLIC MEETING DOES
NOT INFRINGE UPON THE COMMUNrIY'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF

ACCESS-I Witeland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d
177 (3d Cir. 1999).
On June 24, 1996, real estate developer Whiteland Woods, L.P.
filed a conditional application with West Whiteland Township
(Township) of Chester County, Pennsylvania to construct homes on a
162.5-acre lot within the Township. See Whiteland Woods, L.P. v.
Township of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 178 (3d Cir. 1999). The
application was to be heard on September 25, 1996 at a meeting of
the Township Planning Commission. At this meeting, the attorney
for Whiteland Woods supplied the application to the Planning
Commission and arranged for a videotaping of the meeting. See id. at
178-79. In response to the attempt to videotape the meeting, the
Township Solicitor stated that a discussion of videotaping rules was in
order. The Solicitor further stated that any conclusion reached
would apply only prospectively. Whiteland Woods subsequently was
able to videotape the meeting.
At the conclusion of the September 25 meeting, the Solicitor
prepared a resolution that prohibited videotaping and video
recording of Township meetings. See id. The resolution was placed
on the agenda and discussed at the conclusion of the meeting. The
President of the Planning Commission remarked that the videotaping
would discourage frank discussion by Township residents. Some
Commission members felt resentment for being videotaped, while
others believed it could be intimidating. Conversely, other members
commented that Pennsylvania's Sunshine Act required the allowance
of videotaping. The Planning Commission eventually adopted by a
four-to-two vote the resolution prohibiting videotaping of public
meetings in the Township.
On October 4, 1996, counsel for Whiteland Woods informed the
Planning Commission of the real estate developer's plan to videotape
the upcoming meeting of October 9, 1996. One day before the
scheduled meeting, the Planning Commission informed Whiteland
Woods that videotaping was no longer acceptable, stating, "Under the
circumstances, if you decide to undertake the effort and expense of
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bringing video cameras and videotaping equipment to the meeting
you must do so at your own risk...." Id. In addition, on October 8,
1996, the Township's Board of Supervisors enacted a resolution
forbidding the use of video recording devices at Township Board
meetings.
The resolution stated, "Only audio recording or
stenographic recording equipment may be used ... [and] no video
recording equipment shall be permitted" at Township meetings. Id.
Representatives of Whiteland Woods appeared at the October 9,
1996 Planning Commission meeting with video equipment but
Officer John Curran of the West Whiteland Police Department
thwarted their efforts. Officer Curran notified Whiteland Woods that
they would not be permitted to videotape the meeting. As a result,
Whiteland Woods did not videotape the meeting.
Whiteland Woods thereafter filed suit against the Township in
state court, seeking injunctive relief and relief under the
Pennsylvania Declaratory Judgments Act for violations of the
Sunshine Act. See id. In addition, Whiteland Woods sought a
preliminary injunction to prevent the Township from enforcing the
two resolutions. See id. On October 16, 1996, the Township waived
its right to a hearing on the preliminary injunction and conceded to
the state court that the Township could not enforce either resolution
in light of the Sunshine Act. See id. On October 17, 1996, the state
court enjoined the Township from enforcing either resolution. See
id. at 179-80.
The Planning Commission and the Board of
Supervisors accordingly allowed videotaping of their meetings. See id.
at 180. Since October 22, 1996, Whiteland Woods has videotaped
every meeting of the Board of Supervisors. See id.
Whiteland Woods then filed suit in state court on November 13,
1996, seeking damages in excess of $2.1 million and attorney's fees.
See id. Whiteland Woods alleged that the Township violated its First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights and sued under § 1983 of title 42
of the United States Code, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the
Pennsylvania Sunshine Act. See id. The Township then removed the
action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and filed a third-party complaint against the Township
Solicitor for advising the Planning Commission that it was lawful to
proscribe videotaping. See id. By mid-December, 1996, the Planning
Commission and the Board of Supervisors rescinded their respective
resolutions. See id.
The district court granted summary judgment for the Township,
finding no First or Fourteenth Amendment violations against
Whiteland Woods. See id. The district court dismissed the First
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Amendment claim because the videotaping ban was a reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction. See id. The district court also
dismissed the developer's Fourteenth Amendment claim, finding that
the Township did not violate the substantive due process rights of
Whiteland Woods. See id. With respect to Whiteland Woods's request
for injunctive relief, the district court ruled that the point was moot.
See id. The district court then refused to hear the state-law claims
following the dismissal of the federal claims. See id.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge
Scirica, first identified the issue on appeal of whether the United
States Constitution grants a right to videotape a public meeting of a
local planning commission given that alternative effective means exist
for recording the proceedings. See id.
The judge first established that the public has a constitutional
right to receive ideas and information. See id. (citing Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). Judge Scirica observed that this
right serves to protect free discussion of public affairs. See id. (citing
Globe Newspaper v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982)). Based on
this framework, the court concluded that Whiteland Woods has a
constitutional right of access to the Township Planning Commission
meetings. See id. at 180-81. In reaching this conclusion, the court
engaged in a two-prong analysis for determining whether the public
has a constitutional right of access to a specific government
proceeding. See id. The first prong, explained Judge Scirica, is
whether process and place historically have been open to the general
public and the press. See id. The second prong, the judge continued,
is whether public access affects significantly and positively the
functioning of the specific process in question. See id.
Turning to the court's analysis, Judge Scirica noted that several
state statutes require public access to Township Planning
Commission meetings. See id. The court articulated that, although
the Planning Commission holds only an advisory position, the
legislature intended that planning commissions take an active role in
municipal development and land use. See id. The court recounted
that the openness of public meetings furthers the goals of public
awareness of land use issues and promotes a public perception of
fairness in the process. See id. Judge Scirica also noted that
community members who engage in these meetings are put on notice
that the community will evaluate their conduct. See id. The court
concluded, therefore, that Township Planning Commission meetings
fell within the purview of the First Amendment guarantee of a public
right of access. See id.
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Qualifying this public right, Judge Scirica explained that this
right is not absolute. See id. The judge noted that the First
Amendment rights of the public and press are not absolute in the
context of criminal trials, for example. See id. (citing Richmond
Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 n.18 (1980)). Judge
Scirica instructed that "the First Amendment does not require
unfettered access to government information." Id. at 182.
The court then discussed various approaches to First
Amendment claims regarding right of access. See id. Judge Scirica
reviewed the district court's analysis under the traditional public
forum doctrine, which allows for reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions on speech provided that the speech is content neutral,
the restrictions have a rational basis, and other channels of
communication are left open. See id. at 182 n.2 (citing Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). The judge also noted that
the Eleventh Circuit similarly engaged in a reasonable time, place,
and manner restriction analysis when adjudicating prohibitions on
recordings. See id. (citing Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120
(11th Cir. 1994)). The court next evaluated the case law of the
Seventh and Second Circuits, which required simply that the
restrictions be content-neutral and reasonable, the standards
applicable to nonpublic forum speech. See id. (citing United States v.
Kerley, 753 F.2d 617, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Yonkers Bd.
ofEduc., 747 F.2d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1984)).
The court subsequently determined that the forum analysis
applied by the district court and various circuit courts was not
necessary to reconcile restrictions on the a right of access. See id. at
182-83. The court explained that a forum analysis is to be applied to
"expressive" or "speech" activity. See id. at 183. Furthermore, Judge
Scirica observed that Whiteland Woods did not claim any
infringement upon its speech or expressive activity, but instead
claimed that their right to receive and record information was
restricted. See id. The judge, therefore, opined that the speech
analysis was inapplicable, concluding that the proper question in
issues involving access to government matters is "whether the
restriction meaningfully interferes with the public's ability to inform
itself of the proceeding." Id.
The court thereafter determined that Whiteland Woods's right
of access to the October 9, 1996 meeting of the Township Planning
Commission was not restricted by the denial of permission to
videotape. See id. Judge Scirica explained that Whiteland Woods was
neither prohibited from expressing its views at the meeting nor from

2000]

1025

SURVEYS

recording the meeting in another fashion. See id. The judge noted
that "the First Amendment does not require states to accommodate
every potential method of recording its proceedings, particularly
where the public is granted alternative means of compiling a
comprehensive record." Id. The court then declared that Whiteland
Woods failed to present a sufficient nexus between the right of access
and the right to videotape. See id. at 183-84. Accordingly, the court
concluded that Whiteland Woods had not proven any infringement
of First Amendment rights. See id at 184.
Judge Scirica next rejected as inapplicable the cases cited by
Whiteland Woods, concluding that Whiteland Woods's right of access
to the Township Planning Commission meetings did not confer a
constitutional right to videotape. See id. The court concluded that,
because Whiteland Woods was able to attend every meeting and
could have acquired the records through other means, there was no
violation of any First Amendment rights. See id.
The court then examined Whiteland Woods's argument that a
violation of their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
rights had occurred when a police officer informed the developer
that it could not videotape the Commission proceeding. See id. The
court explained that, for a plaintiff to prevail on this type of claim,
the conduct by the police officer must be exceedingly egregious. See
id. The court consequently affirmed the district court's
determination on this issue, finding that Officer Curran acted in a
reasonable manner to enforce the resolution. See id. at 185.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was correct in its
determination that no constitutional right to videotape public town
meetings exists. In reaching this conclusion, the court set forth a new
standard for analyzing cases involving the right of access to
information. The court abandoned prior analyses for a bright-line
rule of whether the restriction meaningfully interferes with the
public's ability to access information. The court's new analysis
protects the constitutional right of access to information while
restricting plaintiffs from claiming meritless infringements of their
rights. Although the Constitution guarantees freedom of access to
information, the court correctly pointed out that this right cannot be
exercised by whatever means an individual desires.
JoshuaD. Winneker

